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Twenty-five years after the Berlin Wall came down, a sense of missed possibilities hangs 
over the countries to its east. Amid the euphoria that greeted the sudden implosion of 
communism, hopes ran high. From Bratislava to Ulaan Bataar, democracy and prosperity 
seemed just around the corner.  
Yet, a quarter century on, the mood has changed to disillusion. With a few exceptions, 
the postcommunist countries are seen as failures—their economies peopled by struggling 
pensioners and strutting oligarchs, their politics a realm of ballot stuffing and emerging 
dictators.  
Wars—from Nagorno-Karabakh to Yugoslavia, Chechnya, and now Eastern Ukraine—
have punctured the 40 years of cold peace on the European continent, leaving behind 
enclaves of smoldering violence. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s consolidation of 
autocracy and imperial aggression seem to many emblematic of a more general rot 
spreading from the East.  
“The worst thing about Communism,” quipped the Polish former dissident and 
newspaper editor Adam Michnik, “is what comes after.”1 
An anniversary is a good moment to take stock. We examine here what has changed in 
the countries that shook off Soviet-style tyrannies a generation ago. Gathering statistics 
on economic performance, living standards, health, and politics, we ask whether the facts 
support the prevailing narrative. 
An accurate assessment matters not just for Eastern Europe. The negative view of 
postcommunist reform influences broader debates on global politics. Along with dire 
interpretations of the 2008 world financial crisis, it has caused some to see authoritarian 
state capitalism as the wave of the future. China is cast as a vibrant alternative to the 
dysfunctions of liberal democracy.   
We find that objective evidence contradicts the conventional view. Media images aside, 
life has improved dramatically across the former Eastern Bloc. Since the start of 
transition, the postcommunist countries have grown rapidly. Their citizens live richer, 
longer, and happier lives. In most regards they look today just like other countries at 
similar levels of economic development.2 They have become normal countries—and in 
some ways “better than normal.” 
                                                          
1 Quoted in Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, New York: Penguin, 2006, p.665.  
2 We focus on the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union plus Mongolia. All these underwent 
both political and economic transitions after 1989, replacing central planning with markets and communist 
dictatorship with something else. For simplicity, we refer to these as the “postcommunist countries.” We do not 
include China or Vietnam, which, while embracing capitalism, retained communist political regimes; the 
unreconstructed communist states of Cuba and North Korea; or the successors to Marxist regimes in less developed 
African countries.  
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While on average resembling their peers, the new states of the East have become far more 
diverse. Shedding the Moscow-imposed model, they have yielded to the pull of a new 
geographical gravity, converging not with the West but with their non-communist 
neighbors. Central Europe has become more European, Central Asia more Asian. We 
suspect that over the next 25 years these countries’ paths will continue to reflect the 
competition between the same two elemental forces—the global dynamic of economic 
modernization and the tug of geographic specificity.    
 
The starting point 
 
To understand how the postcommunist countries have changed, one must recall how they 
began. Politically, all were authoritarian states governed by a ruling party. Each had 
propaganda writers to tell people what to think, secret police to detect dissidence, and 
prison camps to house regime critics and other criminals. All held “elections” in which 
the party won more than 95 percent of the vote. Except for Yugoslavia and—from 
1960—Albania, each took orders from Moscow, which sent tanks to Hungary in 1956 
and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to crush popular uprisings. 
 
All had centrally controlled economies, in which the state owned most or all property. (Polish 
farms and some East German firms remained private.3) Planners rather than markets set prices. 
Heavy industry dominated, while services languished. In the Soviet Union, the military 
consumed up to 25 percent of GDP, compared with under six percent in the US.4 By 1986, 
Soviet factories had produced a stock of 45,000 nuclear warheads.5 
 
Satisfying consumers was not a priority. To get an apartment in the 1980s, one had to 
wait 15-30 years in Poland and up to 20 years in Bulgaria.6 A quarter of those on the 
Soviet waiting list were already pensioners.7 Wouldbe car buyers in East Germany had to 
place their orders 15 years in advance.8 To save money, the Romanian dictator, Nicolae 
Ceausescu, put all citizens on a low calorie diet. He limited lighting to one 40 watt bulb 
per room, heating in public buildings to 57 degrees Farenheit, and television 
programming to two turgid hours a day.9 
                                                          
3 Anders Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the 
Caucasus, and Central Asia, 2nd Edition, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.15. 
4 World Bank, World Development Indicators, July 2014, gives a figure of 23 percent of GDP for Russia’s military 
expenditure in 1990, citing the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and 5.6 percent of GDP for the US 
in 1988, followed by lower figures in subsequent years; Åslund (2012, p.75) gives the estimate of one quarter of 
GDP for Soviet military spending.  
5 R.S. Norris and H.M. Kristensen, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 2010, 66(4): 77-83. 
6 János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1992, p.234. 
7 Bertrand Renaud, “The Housing System of the Former Soviet Union: Why Do the Soviets Need Housing 
Markets?” Housing Policy Debate, 1992, 3:877-99, at p.889.   
8 Kornai (1992, p.236). 
9 Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993, p.158; Jill Massino, “From Black Caviar to Blackouts: Gender, Consumption, and 
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The communist countries had some achievements. With eight percent of world 
population, the USSR and Eastern Europe won 48 percent of the medals at the 1988 
Seoul Olympics, and boasted 53 of the world’s 100 top chess players.10 Education and 
literacy rates were high. In 1990, the Soviet Union had more doctors per capita than any 
other country.11 
 
By the end, communism had few defenders. To the Czech dissident-turned-president 
Vaclav Havel the system was a “monstrously huge, noisy and stinking machine.”12 
Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, called his country’s economy “a voracious, 
resource-squandering” system.13  
 
Creating markets 
 
And then, unexpectedly, this system collapsed. New leaders elected across the East found 
economies in crisis. In 1989, inflation hit 640 percent in Poland and 2,700 percent in 
Yugoslavia.14  By 1991, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, its output was falling by 15 
percent a year.15 
 
To a greater or lesser extent, all postcommunist countries enacted reforms to free prices 
and trade, balance budgets, cut inflation, create competition, privatize state enterprises, 
establish market institutions, and construct social welfare programs. These measures 
reshaped the economies of the East.  
 
A few statistics tell the story. From command economies, the postcommunist countries 
became on average more market friendly than the rest of the world. By 2011, they 
averaged 7.0 on the Fraser Institute’s index of economic freedom, compared to a global 
average of 6.8. The most reformed, Estonia, ranked right between the US and Denmark.16  
 
                                                          
Lifestyle in Ceausescu’s Romania,” in Paulina Bren and Mary Neuburger, eds., Communism Unwrapped: 
Consumption in Cold War Eastern Europe, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp.226-47. 
10 Calculated from www.olympic.org/seoul-1988-summer-olympics, population from World Bank, World 
Development Indicators, July 2014; chess ratings at http://fidelists.blogspot.com/2008/03/january-1988-fide-rating-
list.html. 
11 US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Former Soviet Union in Transition, M.E. Sharpe, 1993, p.855, 
gives figure of 4.42 doctors per 1,000 of population for USSR in 1990; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 
July 1994, has Uruguay in second place with 3.7 per 1,000 population. 
12 Vaclav Havel, “The Art of the Impossible,” (first speech as President of Czechoslovakia), translated in The 
Spectator, 27 January, 1990, pp.11-13. 
13 Quoted in Vladimir Mau and Irina Starodubrovskaya, The Challenge of Revolution: Contemporary Russia in 
Historical Perspective, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.181.  
14 Fabrizio Coricelli and Roberto Rezende Rocha, “Stabilization Programs in Eastern Europe: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Polish and Yugoslav Programs of 1990,” Washington, DC: World Bank, 1991, pp.6, 22. 
15 Anders Åslund, “Russia’s Economic Transformation,” in Michael Alexeev and Shlomo Weber, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of the Russian Economy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp.86-101, at p.90. 
16 James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and Joshua Hall, "2013 Economic Freedom Dataset," published in Economic 
Freedom of the World: 2013 Annual Report, Fraser Institute, 2013, www.freetheworld.com/datasets_efw.html.  
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In most places, state-owned industrial dinosaurs gave way to private firms, which now 
produce 70 percent of output in the median postcommunist country.17 Industry shrank, 
and services swelled from 36 to 58 percent of output on average.18 In no other region has 
international trade grown as fast, with exports plus imports soaring from 75 to 114 
percent of GDP on average.19 From trading largely with each other, the postcommunist 
states have reoriented towards the markets of Europe. By 2012, exports to the EU made 
up 69 percent of the total in the median East European country and 47 percent in the 
median former Soviet republic.20  
 
In short, the postcommunist countries have metamorphosed from militarized, 
overindustrialized state-dominated systems to service-oriented market economies based 
on private ownership and integrated into global trading networks. No longer distorted to 
fit Marxist blueprints, their economic structures, trade, and regulatory environments 
today look very much like those of other countries at similar income levels.    
 
The impact of the reforms has been profound. But evaluations differ. The reforms are 
often blamed for poor economic performance in Eastern Europe—either because they 
were fundamentally misconceived or because they were implemented in too radical a 
fashion. Thus, two questions arise. First, was economic performance poor? And, second, 
did reform strategies affect outcomes as influential critics contend?  
 
 
Economic performance 
 
To assess economic performance, a logical—although problematic—starting point is 
national income. It is problematic because under communism much of the output 
recorded by accountants was worth far less than they claimed. 
 
First, factories over-reported production in order to get bonuses, inflating GDP by up to 
five percent. Second, many goods—although counted in the statistics—were of such 
shoddy quality that consumers refused to buy them. Third, investment spending paid in 
part for hoards of materials and huge construction sites that were never completed—items 
that created no value but still showed up in GDP. Fourth, the benefit of massive Soviet 
defense outlays was at least questionable.  
 
Much of the reported slump early on—half of it, by one estimate—reflected cuts in these 
fictitious or largely worthless activities.21 How little of officially recorded national 
income ended up in citizens’ pockets in many communist countries is suggested by the 
data on household consumption. Whereas in most countries, more than 60 percent of 
                                                          
17 Figure as of 2010, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD Structural Change Indicators, 
accessed August 2014, at http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/macro.shtml.  
18 World Bank, World Development Indicators, July 2014,  
19 World Bank, World Development Indicators, July 2014,  
20 Figures assembled from various sources: see Table 1.  
21 See discussion in Åslund (2012, pp.70-77). 
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GDP goes towards household final consumption, in Russia in 1990 less than one third 
did, and in Azerbaijan less than one quarter.22  
 
Still, even if we take official GDP figures at face value, the picture they reveal does not 
fit the pessimistic narrative. Despite the initial contraction, the median postcommunist 
country (Uzbekistan) grew slightly faster between 1990 and 2011 than the median 
country elsewhere in the world (Norway). While Norwegian GDP per capita increased by 
45 percent, Uzbekistan’s rose 47 percent. Bosnia and Herzegovina—where income grew 
by more than five times—was the third fastest in the world between these years. Albania, 
which grew 134 percent, came 16th and Poland, growing 119 percent, 20th. All three 
outpaced such growth engines as Singapore and Hong Kong.23  
 
The increase in consumption was equally dramatic. In the median postcommunist 
country, household final consumption per capita grew by 53 percent between 1990 and 
2011, compared to a median increase of 45 percent elsewhere in the world. Consumption 
in Poland soared 146 percent, a rise that equaled Korea’s, while Russia’s consumption 
more than doubled, growing faster than in 82 percent of countries.  
 
Of course, the path for states changing economic systems crossed a steep valley, whereas 
that for most others sloped gently uphill. Along the way, many postcommunist states had 
years of high inflation and unemployment. Still, by 2012 inflation had stabilized almost 
everywhere and the annual rate had dropped below the world median. Unemployment 
moved towards the global average after 2000 but still remained several percentage points 
higher.24  
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Figures from the Penn World Tables (PWT), version 8.0, variable csh_c (share of household consumption at 
current PPPs). 
23 Figures from the Penn World Tables (PWT), version 8.0. For making comparisons between countries in a given 
year, we use estimates of GDP or consumption expenditure adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). To compare 
growth rates over time, the appropriate metric is GDP per capita in constant local currency units; changes in PPP-
adjusted figures would include changes in countries’ relative prices mixed in with changes in real output. We use the 
series rgdpna (real GDP at constant 2005 national prices, in million 2005 US dollars), and divide by the population 
data from the World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), July 2014, to generate real per capita GDP. We 
use Penn World Tables for income and consumption as its coverage for the postcommunist countries is more 
complete. For population data, however, we use WDI because the PWT series appears to be quite inaccurate. For 
instance, its figure for China’s population in 2011, 1.324 billion, is about 16 million lower than the Chinese census 
of November 2010 reported (and population was growing, not falling; http://web.archive.org/web/20131108022004/ 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20110428_402722244.htm). The WDI figure was much 
closer. For India, PWT 8.0 gives a population of 1.241 billion for 2011, 31 million more than in the 2011 Indian 
Census, which gives 1.210 billion (http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/paper2-
vol2/prov_results_paper2_indiavol2.html). Again, the WDI figure, 1.221 billion, is much closer. Such data choices 
affect the conclusions only slightly. The estimated change in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2011 is: 45 percent 
(postcommunist) and 46 percent (others) using the PWT 8.0 data on both GDP and population, and 47 percent 
(postcommunist) and 43 percent (others) using the WDI data on both. Using the WDI data, one can calculate the 
medians for growth in 1990-2012: 50 percent (postcommunist) and 45 percent (others). None of these support the 
view that the postcommunist countries have underperformed significantly relative to others.  
24 WDI data.  
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Standard of living and health 
 
Given that so much output under late communism was fictitious or wasted, it helps to 
examine concrete indicators of living standards. Many of these suggest dramatic 
improvements.  
 
Even as GDP fell in the early 1990s, more and more postcommunist citizens were buying 
cars. Between 1993 (the first year with comprehensive statistics) and 2011, the average 
among the postcommunist states went from one passenger car for every 10 people to one 
car for every four, almost as high as the rate in Israel. In Lithuania, Slovenia, and Poland, 
there are now more cars per person than in the UK.25  
 
From an information technology backwater, Eastern Europe surged ahead. The number of 
phone lines per capita grew twice as fast as elsewhere, edging past Latin America. By 
2013, cellphone subscriptions per person, at 1.24, had overtaken the West. Internet 
users—averaging 54 percent of the population—are more widespread in the 
postcommunist world today than in any region except Western Europe and North 
America.26   
 
Communist citizens were rarely allowed to travel abroad. In 2012, residents of these 
countries made almost 170 million international tourist trips.27 Back home, they occupied 
larger apartments. Living space rose—at least where statistics were available—by 99 
percent in the Czech Republic, 85 percent in Armenia, 39 percent in Russia.28 Thanks to 
mass housing privatization programs, rates of home ownership rocketed to some of the 
highest in the world. In all 20 postcommunist countries for which data were available, the 
share of housing owned by occupants exceeded 75 percent, and in 11 the rate was over 90 
percent. That compares to 67 percent in the UK and 53 percent in Germany.29  
 
They also ate better. In seven of the nine former Soviet republics that publish statistics on 
this consumption of fruits and vegetables shot up. Ukrainians, for instance, ate 58 percent 
more vegetables in 2011 than in 1991, and 47 percent more fruit. Figures are harder to 
find for Eastern Europe, but some tell a similar story. In Hungary, vegetable consumption 
was up 35 percent by 2005, while fruit consumption had risen 15 percent. Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia experienced what medical researchers 
described as “probably the most rapid decrease in coronary heart disease ever observed,” 
because of substitution of vegetable oils for animal fats.30   
                                                          
25 Data from UN Economic Committee for Europe, Transport Division,  
(http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/Saveshow.asp?lang=1), supplemented for recent years in some countries from 
WDI, plus figures for Tajikistan from Tajik state statistical agency. In place of 2011, final reading is for 2010 for 
Kyrgyzstan, 2009 for Canada, and 2008 for Turkmenistan.  
26 All from WDI.  
27 WDI data.  
28 Figures from various sources, see Table 2.  
29 Various sources, see Table 3.  
30 Witold Zatonski, Hannia Campos, and Walter Willett, “Rapid declines in coronary heart disease mortality in 
Eastern Europe are associated with increased consumption of oils rich in alpha-linolenic acid,” European Journal of 
Epidemiology, 2008(23): 3–10, at p.6. 
7 
 
 
More postcommunist citizens attended college. Access to tertiary education, already high, 
surged even more after 1989, increasing by 33 percentage points on average. By 2012, 
more secondary school graduates enrolled in higher education in the average 
postcommunist country than did so in Switzerland.31  
 
Poverty often increased in the early transition, along with income inequality. But in 
recent years both the poverty rate and the Gini coefficient were significantly lower in the 
postcommunist countries than in others at comparable income levels.32 Although 
available statistics may miss part of the picture on inequality, the stereotype of oligarchs 
and beggars appears off target.  
 
Communism left behind a blighted environment, and not just around Chernobyl. East 
Germany discharged more than seven times as much sulfur oxide per capita as West 
Germany, and more than three times as much as the US.33 Things have improved. On 
average, the 11 postcommunist EU members have slashed emissions of nitrogen oxides, 
sulphur oxides and carbon monoxide each by more than 50 percent since 1990.34 Twelve 
post-Soviet republics cut the release of harmful pollutants into the air from stationary 
sources by 66 percent on average between 1991 and 2012.35 This happened even as 
postcommunist economies grew.  
 
Newspapers overflowed with accounts of soaring mortality amid the stress of transition. 
On average, however, life expectancy rose from 69 years in 1990 to 73 years in 2012.36 
The speed of improvement was two thirds faster than in the communist 1980s. Russia’s 
life expectancy today, at 70.5, is higher than it has ever been.37 Infant mortality, already 
low, fell faster in percentage terms than in any other world region.38   
 
Eastern Europe is infamous for unhealthy binge drinking. However, average alcohol 
consumption fell between 1990 and 2010—from 7.9 to 7.6 liters of pure alcohol a year 
per resident aged over 14.39 There were exceptions—drinking rose in Russia and the 
Baltic states—but even in Russia recorded consumption in 2010, 11.1 liters, was lower 
                                                          
31 WDI data. 
32 Poverty data are percent poor under the national poverty rate from WDI; we use the average of available years 
between 2009 and 2013. Gini index is the estimated Gini index of inequality in equivalized household disposable 
income, from the SWIID database (Frederick Solt,\Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database," Social 
Science Quarterly, 2009, 90(2): 231-242. SWIID Version 4.0, September 2013.), using the average of available 
years between 2008 and 2012.   
33 Kornai (1992, p.179).  
34 European Environment Agency, European Union Emission Inventory Report, 1990-2012, 2014, 
(http://www.eea.europa.eu//publications/lrtap-2014). See Table 5.  
35 Various sources, see Table 6.  
36 Data from WDI.  
37 Rosstat, Rossiisky Statistichesky Yezhegodnik 2013.  
38 WDI data.  
39 Data for recorded alcohol consumption in liters of pure alcohol consumed per year per person aged 15 and over, 
1990 to 2010 except for Moldova and Turkmenistan (1992-2010) and Macedonia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (1992-
2009). From World Health Organization, Global Information System on Alcohol and Health, 
http://www.who.int/gho/alcohol/en/, accessed August 2014.  
8 
 
than that in Germany, France, Ireland, or Austria. (Of course, more drinking might escape 
the statisticians in the Slavic region.) Smoking among adult males was high—42 percent 
on average—but about the same as in Asia.  
 
In short, almost all statistics suggest a dramatic improvement in the quality of life since 
1989 for citizens of the average postcommunist country—an improvement that rivals and 
often exceeds those in other parts of the world.  
 
 
Politics and corruption 
 
The promise of 1989 was not just to improve living standards. Many hungered for a state 
that would respect civil rights and allow citizens to choose their own leaders. How have 
political regimes changed since then?  
 
The most common measure—the Polity2 index—rates countries on a scale that we 
adjusted to run from 0 (“pure dictatorship”) to 100 (“pure democracy”). In 1988, the 
regimes of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Mongolia scored from 5 (Albania) to 
40 (Hungary), averaging 20, around the ratings of Egypt and Iran. For countries as 
economically developed as they were, their political systems were abnormally 
authoritarian.40  
 
After the popular revolutions of 1989-91, the average shot up to 68 in 1993 and 76 in 
2013. Democracy was surging worldwide in these years. But in the postcommunist 
countries, it surged faster. Today, the average postcommunist country is exactly as 
democratic as its income level would predict. Of 29 postcommunist countries, 22 are 
rated 80 or higher, the threshold to be considered democratic, and six have perfect scores 
of 100.  
 
These countries also demilitarized. Where Soviet defense spending had risen to 25 
percent of GDP, none of the successor states, including Russia, now spends more than 
five percent.41 Despite their new internal borders, the former Warsaw Pact countries have 
cut one million troops. The Soviet nuclear stockpile—inherited by Russia—shrank from 
45,000 to 4,500 warheads, most in storage.42 Notwithstanding the conflicts in Yugoslavia 
and Chechnya, postcommunist countries were no more likely than others to experience 
war or civil war in a given year.43 Nor did they have a significantly higher rate of deaths 
in war or guerrilla violence, either in absolute numbers or per capita.  
 
Postcommunist officials have a reputation for graft. Indexes of “perceived corruption” 
typically grade Eastern Europe harshly. Are such judgments deserved? Of course, 
                                                          
40 Data from Polity IV, 2013 update,  http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. We treat the individual 
republics of the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia as independent units; using the three countries as single 
observations would yield a median of -7. 
41 Data from WDI, citing the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
42 See http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.  
43 Data from Correlates of War project, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/datasets.htm.  
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measuring actual corruption is extremely hard. Still, the NGO Transparency International 
surveys respondents in many countries, asking whether they came in contact with state 
agencies in the previous year, and if so whether they paid a bribe.44 In 2010-13, a smaller 
proportion (23 percent) reported paying a bribe in the average postcommunist state than 
in others (28 percent). Their rates of corruption were high but—for their levels of 
economic development—absolutely typical.   
 
For much of the transition period, postcommunist citizens were less likely to say they 
were happy than their peers elsewhere. But in the latest round of the World Values 
Survey, conducted in 2010-14, that gap had closed.45 Worldwide, 84 percent reported 
being “very” or “quite” happy. In the average postcommunist country, it was 81 percent. 
For their income levels, they were about as happy as one would expect.   
 
Normal countries?  
 
Twenty-five years ago, the countries of the Soviet Bloc represented an alternative model, 
even civilization. To imagine them quickly converging with the global mainstream 
required a certain chutzpah. Yet that is exactly what they have done.  
As simple statistical tests confirm, the postcommunist countries are today 
indistinguishable in most regards from others at comparable stages of economic 
development. The structures of their economies, consumption patterns, reported 
corruption levels, and political systems are all normal for their income levels.  
Where they do differ, it is often because they look “better than normal.” Their citizens 
enroll in higher education at higher rates, buy more mobile phone subscriptions, and use 
the internet more than in comparably developed countries. Their health systems inoculate 
more children and prevent infant mortality more effectively. Measured poverty and 
inequality are lower.   
They are not perfect. Unemployment remains several percentage points “too high.” 
Postcommunist citizens smoke and drink more than typical for countries with their GDP 
per capita. (Since alcohol consumption increases with national income, this actually 
makes them look more developed than they are.) Such vices notwithstanding, life 
expectancy is on average exactly as high as income would predict.  
Although no longer unhappier than their peers, postcommunist citizens do appear 
unusually discontented with their social surroundings. They express significantly less 
trust in government (although not in ordinary people) and greater dissatisfaction with 
their jobs, living standards, education and healthcare systems.46 Their suicide rates, 
                                                          
44 See http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013.  
45 See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp.  
46 Data from Gallup World Poll, as in Human Development Report 2014 dataset, various years between 2007 and 
2012.  
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although they are now lower than they were under late communism, remain relatively 
high.47  
 
Hares and tortoises 
On average, the postcommunist countries have transformed their economies and political 
systems, becoming typical for their—rising—income levels. That has meant a lot of 
progress. But the average masks huge variation. Communism imposed uniformity. Freed 
from Moscow’s brace, postcommunist countries have diverged from one another, 
spreading out on almost all dimensions.  
Why did some countries do much better than others? Why is Poland today a liberal 
market democracy whose income has more than doubled since 1990, while Turkmenistan 
has become a sultanistic petrostate with an economy rated less free than Yugoslavia’s 
under late communism?48 
While the full answer is not yet known, one that is widely believed is clearly mistaken. 
From early on, critics claimed that reforms had failed in certain Eastern European states 
because they had been pursued in too radical a manner. Countries that proceeded more 
slowly and methodically were said to have fared better.  
As Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz put it: “gradualist policies lead to less pain in the short 
run, greater social and political stability, and faster growth in the long [run]. In the race 
between the tortoise and the hare, it appears that the tortoise has won again.”49  
This view appealed to those in the East whose privileges were threatened by 
liberalization and those in the West who distrusted market forces or felt excluded from 
the debate. But it was wrong. By the mid-1990s, countries that had embraced radical 
reform were outperforming those that had delayed.   
To measure the pace of reform, we use indicators constructed by the EBRD. Each year, 
the bank’s experts rated postcommunist countries on how closely they resembled a free 
market economy. We label “radical reformers” countries that in their first three years of 
transition moved up more than 40 points on the EBRD’s scale, recalibrated to run from 0 
to 100. (We date the transition from 1989 in Eastern Europe, 1990 in Mongolia and the 
former Yugoslavia, and 1991 in the former Soviet Union.) “Gradual reformers” increased 
by 25 to 40 points, and “slow reformers” by less than 25 points. The “radical reformers,” 
by this definition, were Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan.     
                                                          
47 Data from World Health Organization database, age adjusted standardized death rate per 100,000 from intentional 
self-harm, all ages, both sexes.  
48 EBRD Transition Indicators for rating of market economy—in 1989, Yugoslavia scored 1.58 compared to 1.50 for 
Turkemenistan in 2010, the final year or the ratings.  
49 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents, New York: Norton, 2002, p.188.  
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Did radical reform entail greater economic cost? Figure 1 shows the path of output for the 
median radical, gradual, and slow reforming countries over the first 21 years of transition. 
Slow reformers did by far the worst. Radical reformers suffered a slightly greater fall 
than gradual ones in the first three years. But then they surged ahead, far outpacing the 
gradualists. The gradual reformers did eventually catch up—but only after suffering far 
more years of depressed output.  
The difference is substantial. If we add up the “total loss before recovery”—that is, the 
area between the horizontal 100-percent line and each curve—the loss for the gradualists 
is about 40 percent greater—and that for the slow reformers about 140 percent greater—
than that for the radical reformers (each measured relative to initial output). Had the 
median gradual reformer perfomed as well as the median radical reformer over these 21 
years, it would have generated additional output equal to 1.4 times its transition year 
output.  
 
 
 
Radical reformers also did much better if one considers household consumption instead 
of income, and they also tended to reduce inflation faster. Unemployment figures are not 
0
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Figure 1: GDP per capita during the transition 
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Sources: GDP per capita is an index based on GDP in constant local currency units (Penn World 
Tables, 8.0) and population from World Development Indicators (July 2014); reform speed from EBRD
Transition Indicators.
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available before 1991, but the countries with the highest unemployment rates—
Macedonia, Bosnia, Armenia—were all slow reformers.50  
One should not put too much trust in data collected during an economic revolution. Still, 
there is no evidence that a slower approach to reform reduced the pain of transition. All 
signs point in the opposite direction. It was the hares, not the tortoises, that won. Many of 
the tortoises eventually caught up, but after a more painful trek.   
 
 
History and geography 
 
Amid the post-1989 celebrations, many hoped that all the liberated countries would 
converge quickly with the West. The “end of history” seemed to imply a common 
destination, to be reached simultaneously by all.  
 
But if history was over, geography was not. A pattern leaps out from any map of the 
postcommunist region. Countries have been converging, but towards another target—
their neighbors. In multiple ways, they have become more like the non-communist 
countries nearest to their borders.  
 
The Baltic states have converged towards Finland; the Caucasus countries towards 
Turkey and Iran; Central Asia in the direction of Iran and Afghanistan. Central Europe 
has approached Germany and Austria, but with the occasional tug from neighbors to its 
east. Of course, there are exceptions: Belarus is far more authoritarian than its nearest 
non-communist neighbors. But in most cases, having escaped the gravity that previously 
pulled them to Moscow, the satellites have sped outward, merging into their local 
environment.  
 
The characteristics of each country’s nearest non-communist neighbors when the Wall 
fell provide powerful hints about how that country would change in subsequent years. 
Controlling for a country’s own characteristics, the richer, more democratic, and more 
economically liberal its non-communist neighbors were in 1990, the more the country 
developed, democratized, and marketized its economy over the next two decades. 
Convergence toward the neighbors shows up in more subtle ways as well—for instance, 
in rates of college enrolment, alcohol consumption, and even life expectancy.  
 
While such convergence has seen Central Europe speed ahead, it has also shown Central 
Asia fall behind. The direct influence of neighbors is sometimes responsible, as when 
Islamist rebels attack Tajikistan from across the Afghan border or when German factories 
set up component plants in the Czech Republic. But often convergence must reflect 
underlying cultural characteristics that extend across national boundaries. Local 
traditions, frozen or repressed under communism, have reemerged, influencing a range of 
social practices and institutions.  
                                                          
50 Using WDI data on “unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate),” Armenia’s 
unemployment rate was above 18 percent, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s was above 20 percent, and Macedonia’s was 
above 30 percent throughout the entire period from 1991 to 2012.    
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Russia 
 
Ten years ago, we argued in this journal that Russia had become a “normal country,” 
comparable to others at a similar level of economic development. We speculated that its 
growth might continue, modernizing society along the way. Since then, Russia’s GDP per 
capita has increased another 39 percent and its internet penetration has quadrupled, 
overtaking Greece.51  
Turning to politics, we outlined two scenarios. The first posited “increased democratic 
competition and the emergence of a more vigorous civil society.” The second foresaw 
“an accelerating slide toward an authoritarian regime … managed by security-service 
professionals under the fig leaf of formal democratic procedures.” We conjectured—far 
too optimistically, it turned out—that reality would end up somewhere in between. In 
fact, Russia’s president chose the second option.  
With its overdeveloped military capability, that makes Russia dangerous. But does it 
make the country politically abnormal? Perhaps surprisingly, if one plots countries’ 
Polity2 scores against their income, Russia still lies only slightly below the regression 
line. It scores a 4 in 2013, on a par with Venezuela and Sri Lanka, while the average 
Polity2 rating for countries with income between $15,000 and $25,000 is a little over 5.   
If Russia grows richer without liberalizing politically, it will look anomalous. Only three 
groups of countries are wealthier than Russia today: developed democracies; oil-rich 
dictatorships, mostly in the Persian Gulf; and commercial city states such as Singapore 
and Macau. The third path is clearly closed to Russia.  
In fact, the second is too. To become an Arabian-style dictatorship requires more 
revenues than Russia’s resources generate. In 2011, the oil and gas Russia produced was 
worth about $3,000 per Russian citizen. In Saudi Arabia, the figure was $13,000, in 
Kuwait $34,000.52 The choice appears to be between economic stagnation or further 
development combined with more democratic politics. At present, Russia’s leaders seem 
to be choosing the former, but that can change.  
 
Conclusion 
Twenty-five years ago, a series of largely peaceful revolutions swept away the most 
territorially extended tyranny that had existed since the days of the Mongol Horde. A 
nuclear-armed communist empire disintegrated, freeing its more than 400 million 
inhabitants to forge new political and economic orders.  
 
                                                          
51 WDI data. Internet users per 100 people was 13 in 2004, 61 in 2013, compared to 60 in Greece.  
52 Michael L. Ross, 2011-04, "Replication data for: Oil and Gas Production and Value, 1932-2009", 
http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlross. 
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The transition has had its disappointments. Central Asia hardly inspires emulation. Russia 
and Hungary have taken political wrong turns. But, overall, the changes since 1989 have 
been a remarkable success.  
 
In most postcommunist states, life has improved, often dramatically. Citizens enjoy 
higher living standards, broader political rights, greater autonomy and personal dignity. 
Their countries resemble not necessarily those in the West, but others at comparable 
levels of economic development. Those levels of development have, in turn, converged 
towards those typical of each postcommunist state’s neighborhood. The communist 
bloc’s rigid iron curtain has given way to a pattern of gentler cartographical gradients.  
 
It is time to rethink the misperceptions that inform debates about this period. Market 
reforms, attempts to build democracy, and struggles against corruption were not failures, 
although they remain incomplete. The claim that a gradual path of economic change 
would have been more effective and less painful is contradicted by the evidence. The 
postcommunist transition does not reveal the inadequacy of liberal capitalism or the 
dysfunctions of democracy: it reveals the superiority of both over all attempted 
alternatives. These are the lessons that future historians will draw. We should recognize 
them now.   
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Table 1: Destination of Exports of Post-Communist Countries 
                       EU Other (current or former) 
Soviet republics 
CMEA (or former members) 
 1990 2012 1990 2012 1990 2012 
Soviet republics       
Armenia 1 39 97 30   
Azerbaijan 2 47 92 8   
Belarus 2 38 92 62   
Kazakhstan 2 50 89 14   
Kyrgyz 1 3 97 59   
Moldova 1 47 93 45   
Russia 7 47 68 18   
Tajikistan 4 4 82 20   
Turkmenistan 1  96    
Ukraine 4 25 83 39   
Uzbekistan 2  89 54   
Estonia 0 58 98 29   
Georgia 2 15 91 53.6   
Latvia 1 69 97 44.5   
Lithuania 1 61 94 47.3   
median  47     
Eastern Europe+Mongolia       
Albania  76   46.3 d 2 
Bosnia 38 a 58   29.9 d  
Bulgaria  58   53 21 e 
Croatia 38 a 58   29.9 d  
Czech Republic 26.5 b 81   37 25 
Hungary 32.2 b 76   41 d 30 
Macedonia 38 a 63   29.9 d  
Mongolia  6     
Poland 47.2 b 75   41 d 26 
Romania 33.8 c 70   25 22 
Serbia 38 a 58   29.9 d  
Slovak Republic 26.5 b 84   37 36 
Slovenia 38 a 69   29.9 d  
median  69     
Sources and Notes:  
Column 1: For Soviet Union calculated from Michalopoulos, Constantine and David G. Tarr, 1994, Trade in the New 
Independent States, Washington, DC: World Bank, pp.2, 239, and column 3. a figure for Yugoslavia in 1988, from OECD, 
Economic Surveys: Yugoslavia 1990, Paris: OECD, 1990, p.101. b  Rodrik, Dani. "Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe’s Transition: 
Early Results," in Olivier Blanchard, Kenneth Froot, Jeffrey Sachs, eds., Transition in Eastern Europe, Vol. 2, Cambridge, MA: 
NBER, 1994, pp.319-56: figures for Czech and Slovak republics are both for Czechoslovakia. c figure for 1991, from Romanian 
Statistical Agency.   
Column 2: World Trade Organization, Country Profiles, at http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/, accessed August 2014.  
Column 3: Kaminski, Bartlomiej, Zhen Kun Wang, and L. Alan Winters. 1996. Foreign Trade in the Transition: The 
International Environment and Domestic Policy, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Column 4: Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Vneshniaia torgovlia stran Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv (statisticheskii' sbornik). [External Trade of the Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (statistical abstract)], 2013.  
Columns 5-6: Uvalic, Milica. 2005. Trade Liberalization in Southeast Europe: Recent Trends and Some Policy 
Implications, University of Perugia, paper, p.4; information from statistical agencies of Albania, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, accessed August 2014. Figures for Czech and Slovak 
Republics in 1990 are for Czechoslovakia and those of Yugoslav republics are for Yugoslavia. d for 1989, e for 2011.   
 
16 
 
 
Table 2: Housing Space Per Capita, square meters per person) 1991-2011 
 1991 2011 Change, percent 
Azerbaijan 12 17.8 48 
Armenia 15 27.8 85 
Belarus 18 25 39 
Georgia 18 23 28 
Kazakhstan 14 18.7 34 
Kyrgyzstan 12 14.5 21 
Moldova 18 22.4 24 
Russia 16.5 23 39 
Tajikistan 9.5 8.8 -7 
Ukraine 18 23.5 31 
Uzbekistan 12 15 25 
Czech Republic 16.6 33 99 
Romania 11.6 a 25 116 
Sources: Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 15 let Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv 
(1991-2005) [15 years of the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991-2005)], 2006; Statistical Committee of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Statistika SNG: Statistichesky byulleten, 2012 (10, October). Wolfgang Amann, 
Housing review on 23 countries in the Europe and Central Asia region. Vienna: Habitat for Humanity, 2013, p.22. Michelle 
Norris and Patrick Shiels, Regular National Report on Housing Developments in EU Countries, Dublin: Government of Ireland, 
Department of the Environment, 2004, pp.28, 69.  
Notes: a 1992.  
 
Table 3: Percent of housing owned by occupant, 2012 
Armenia 99.6 
Kyrgyzstan 98.3 
Moldova 97.4 
Tajikistan 97.2 
Romania 96.6 
Kazakhstan a 96.4 
Azerbaijan 94.2 
Ukraine 93.5 
Lithuania 91.9 
Hungary 90.5 
Slovakia 90.4 
Croatia 89.5 
Belarus 87.9 
Bulgaria 87.4 
Russia 87 
Poland 82.4 
Estonia 82.2 
Latvia 81.5 
Czech Republic 80.4 
Slovenia 76.2 
Median postcommunist 90.45 
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Other countries  
Norway 84.8 
Malta 81.8 
Spain 78.9 
Iceland 77.3 
Greece 75.9 
Portugal 74.5 
Italy 74.1 
Finland 73.9 
Cyprus 73.2 
Belgium 72.3 
Luxembourg 70.8 
Sweden 70.1 
Ireland 69.6 
Netherlands 67.5 
Turkey b 67.3 
United Kingdom 66.7 
USA b 66.1 
Denmark 64.3 
France 63.7 
Austria 57.5 
Germany 53.3 
Switzerland 43.8 
Sources: Eurostat; Rosstat, Zhilishchnoe khoziai'stvo v Rossii, 2013(1): 277; European Mortgage Federation, Hypostat 2013, 
November 2013, p.101 (http://www.hypo.org/Content/default.asp?PageID=524). 
Notes: a 2011, b 2010 
 
 
  
Table 4: Consumption of vegetables and fruits per person, kg 
 Vegetables (and melons) fruits 
 1991 2011 Change, pct. 1991 2011 Change, pct. 
Azerbaijan 65 165 154 50 75 50 
Armenia 145 288 99 62 76 23 
Belarus 79 144 82 35 58 66 
Kazakhstan 63 195 210 19 48 153 
Kyrgyzstan 73 150 105 18 29 61 
Moldova 113 115 2 79 43 -46 
Russia  86 106 23 35 60 71 
Tajikistan 83 72.8 -12 27 40 48 
Ukraine 103 163 58 36 53 47 
Hungary 83 a 112 b 35 72 a 83 b 15 
Sources: Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Statistika SNG: Statistichesky byulleten, 2012 (12, 
December 31). Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 15 let Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh 
Gosudarstv (1991-2005) [15 years of the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991-2005)], 2006. Statistical office of 
Tajikistan. M Szeitz-Szabó, L. Biró, and Gy. Biró, “Nutritional and Vital Statistical Features of the Hungarian Population: A Review 
About the Past 25 Years,” Acta Alimentaria 2012, 41(2): 277-91. a 1990 b 2005.  
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Table 5: Change in level of emissions, postcommunist EU members, 1990-2012 
 Nitrogen oxides Sulphur oxides Carbon monoxide 
Bulgaria -50 -70 -61 
Croatia -38 -85 -51 
Czech Republic -72 -92 -67 
Estonia -56 -85 -28 
Hungary -51 -96 -69 
Latvia -58 -83 -58 
Lithuania -58 -87 -59 
Poland -36 -73 -62 
Romania -51 -70 -17 
Slovakia -64 -89 -57 
Slovenia -26 -95 -53 
mean -51 -84 -53 
Source: European Union Emission Inventory Report, 1990-2012, European Environment 
Agency, 2014, http://www.eea.europa.eu//publications/lrtap-2014.  
    
 
 
 
Table 6: Emission of Harmful Pollutants Into the Air From Stationary Sources, thousand tonnes 
 1991 2012 change, percent 
Azerbaijan 1919 227 -88 
Armenia 269 117 -57 
Belarus 1153 433 -62 
Georgia 300 21 -93 
Kazakhstan 4278 2384 -44 
Kyrgyzstan 161 37 -77 
Moldova 342 15 -96 
Russia  31,802 19,630 -38 
Tajikistan 101 39 -61 
Ukraine 8775 4335 -51 
Latvia 131 39 -70 
Lithuania 152 a 65 -57 
Mean   -66 
Sources: Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 15 let Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv 
(1991-2005) [15 years of the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991-2005)], 2006, Statistical Committee of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Naselenie i usloviia zhizni v stranakh Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv. 
Population, employment and living conditions in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States., 2013(1). 
Statistical Agency of Lithuania (http://osp.stat.gov.lt/en/statistiniu-rodikliu-analize1), Statistical Agency of Latvia 
(http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/en/vide/vide__ikgad__vide/VI0020.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=a79839fe-11ba-4ecd-
8cc3-4035692c5fc8). 
Notes: a  1995.  
 
